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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O’Shea Sullivan *
and Kevin R. Stone **
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2020 survey period yielded noteworthy decisions relating to
federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, several of which involved issues of first
impression.1 This Article analyzes recent developments in the Eleventh
Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of statutory
interpretation, subject matter jurisdiction, civil procedure, class actions,
and other issues of interest to the trial practitioner.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND REMOVAL
A. New Parties Added to Civil Actions Are Not “Defendants” and Are
Ineligible to Remove Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
In Bowling v. U.S. Bank National Assoc.,2 the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama’s denial of a motion to remand a case after removal of the case
by parties who were not originally sued by the plaintiff, but had been
added to the litigation by the original defendant as “Third-Party

* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1995).
Managing Editor, Mercer Law Review (1994–1995). Member, State Bars of Georgia and
North Carolina.
** Associate in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Belmont University
(B.S., magna cum laude, 2008); University of Florida (M.S., 2011); University of Florida
Levin College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2014 (Order of the Coif)). Member, Florida Law
Review (2012–2014). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1 For an analysis of last year’s trial practice law during the survey period, see John
O'Shea Sullivan, et al., Trial Practice and Procedure, 2019 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 71
MERCER L. REV. 1087 (2020).
2 963 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 2020).
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Counterclaim Defendants.”3 The court admitted the case did not involve
a “riveting topic.”4 However, a Supreme Court of the United States’
opinion,5 published after the district court’s denial of the motion to
remand, changed the law and abrogated case law decided in the former
Fifth Circuit that was binding in the Eleventh Circuit,6 which had stood
as the law for more than forty years.7
The litigation started in state court in Alabama where a purchaser of
real property in a foreclosure sale sued the occupants and mortgagers,
the Bowlings, for ejectment. The Bowlings filed their “Answer and
Counterclaim” which added three new parties as Third-Party
Counterclaim Defendants, the lender and servicers on the foreclosed
loan. The Bowlings’ claims against the Third-Party Counterclaim
Defendants included a mix of state and federal law claims, including
claims for alleged violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, and others. The Third-Party Counterclaim
Defendants removed the entire case to federal court, citing 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441(a) and 1441(c) as grounds.8
The Bowlings moved to remand the case to state court, however, under
the former Fifth Circuit’s decision in Carl Heck Engineers, Inc. v.
Lafourche Parish Police Jury (Carl Heck),9 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c),10 the
district court denied the motion, finding removal was proper.11 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit carefully analyzed Carl Heck.12 In Carl
Heck, the district court refused to remand a case removed by a
third-party defendant and the former Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that
the third-party claim was a “separate and independent claim which if
sued upon alone could have been brought properly in federal court.”13 The
Eleventh Circuit stated that it was understandable that in 2014 the
district court, in Bowling, concluded that the Third-Party Counterclaim

Id. at 1032.
Id.
5 Home Depot U.S.A, Inc. v. Jackson (Home Depot), 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019).
6 Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding all Fifth
Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit).
7 Bowling, 963 F.3d at 1036.
8 Id. at 1033.
9 622 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1980). The district court’s denial of the motion to remand
was decided on April 25, 2014. See 18 F. Supp. 3d 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
10 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
11 Bowling, 963 F.3d at 1033–34. The district court’s denial of the motion to remand was
decided on April 25, 2014. See WGB, LLC v. Bowling, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
12 Bowling, 963 F.3d at 1034. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976).
13 Carl Heck, 622 F.2d at 136.
3
4
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Defendants’ claims were removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) in light of
the decision in Carl Heck.14
By the time Bowling made it to the Eleventh Circuit on appeal, the
law on removal had changed substantially. In what the Eleventh Circuit
called a “removal game-changer,”15 the Supreme Court decided Home
Depot U.S.A, Inc. v. Jackson.16 Home Depot, decided in 2019, abrogated
the holding in Carl Heck and held that the removal statute does not
permit removal by any counterclaim defendant, including parties
brought into the lawsuit for the first time by counterclaim.17
As it did with Carl Heck, the Eleventh Circuit carefully analyzed Home
Depot and the current text of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and (c).18 Discussing
six things that led to the high Court’s holding in Home Depot, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the law on removal is now that “‘a
third-party counterclaim defendant is not a ‘defendant’ who can remove
under § 1441(a).’”19 But because the case at bar involved § 1441(a), and
not § 1441(c), the Eleventh Circuit still needed to determine whether the
principles announced in Home Depot applied to the situation involving
removal of federal and state law claims under § 1441(c).20
The court held that “[e]very analytical tool the Supreme Court relied
on in Home Depot to conclude that counterclaim defendants may not
remove a civil action under § 1441(a) applies with equal force to
§ 1441(c).”21 The court looked to the definition of “defendants” as used in
§ 1441(a) and § 1441(c) to find that “‘identical words and phrases used in
the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.’”22 Having
found that “defendants” in § 1441(a) means the original defendants to the
action, not later-added parties, the court held that § 1441(c)’s use of
“defendants” has the same meaning to allow § 1441(c) to provide
additional criteria for a certain subset of civil actions.23 The court

Bowling, 963 F.3d at 1035.
Id.
16 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019).
17 Bowling, 963 F.3d at 1036.
18 Id. at 1036–38.
19 Id. at 1038 (quoting Home Depot, 139 S. Ct. at 1749).
20 Bowling, 963 F.3d at 1038.
21 Id.
22 Id. (quoting SEC v. Levin, 849 F.3d 995, 1003 (11th Cir. 2017)). See also SCALIA &
GARNER, READING LAW § 25, at 170 (2012) (“[a] word or phrase is presumed to bear the
same meaning throughout a text” unless context requires otherwise).
23 Bowling, 963 F.3d at 1038. The court also looked to the title or caption of § 1441
“Removal of civil actions” to corroborate the textual analysis. The court found that the
change from former § 1441’s use of “claims” to current § 1441’s use of “civil actions” is
14
15
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concluded by declaring that Carl Heck is “no longer good law,” and after
Home Depot, third-party counterclaim defendants and other parties not
originally sued by the plaintiff cannot remove a “civil action” under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c).24
B. Interpretation of “Mass Action” Jurisdiction Statutes
In Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Products Inc.,25 a products liability
case, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in a grueling exercise of statutory
interpretation to assess whether a complaint adequately alleged an
“event or occurrence” so as to fall within the “local event” exception to
removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and
ultimately held that the exception did not apply.26
In Spencer, former workers at a foundry in Alabama claimed they were
harmed by exposure to hazardous and harmful chemicals released and
formed at the foundry. They filed suit in Alabama state court against ten
entities that manufactured, sold, supplied, and distributed the products
they believed harmed them. One defendant removed the case to federal
court under CAFA’s “mass action” provision, which authorizes original
federal jurisdiction over actions seeking more than $5 million in
monetary relief with more than 100 minimally diverse plaintiffs whose
claims involve common questions of law or fact.27 The Plaintiffs moved to
remand the case to state court, citing two reasons, only one of which was
at issue on appeal.28 Specifically, they contended that the case did not
qualify as a “mass action” under CAFA because “all of the claims arise
from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed,”
further reason that for determining removability, it is only the original plaintiff’s claims
that can provide a basis for removal. Id. at 1038–39.
24 Id. at 1040.
25 953 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 2020).
26 Id. at 739.
27 Id. at 737–38; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is a class action in which—(A) any member of a class of
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant; (B) any member of
a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and
any defendant is a citizen of a State; or (C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is
a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of
a foreign state.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)):
As used in subparagraph (A), the term ‘mass action’ means any civil action . . . in
which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried
jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law
or fact . . . .”
28 Spencer, 953 F.3d at 738.
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and this event or occurrence “allegedly resulted in injuries in that
State.”29 In other words, “mass actions” are removable, but not if “all of
the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in
which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that
State or in States contiguous to that State.”30 “This carve-out to federal
jurisdiction is called the ‘local event exception.’”31
The district court remanded to state court, finding that, “because the
foundry was located in Alabama, the plaintiffs worked in Alabama, the
alleged injuries occurred in Alabama, and the sole purchaser of the
defendants’ products was the foundry, this case is ‘truly local’ such that
CAFA jurisdiction would be improper under the local event exception.”32
The focus of the appeal was the local event exception, specifically the
phrase an “event or occurrence.”33 “If the allegations in the complaint
constitute[d] ‘an event or occurrence,’ the [d]istrict [c]ourt was correct in
remanding the case back to state court.”34 If, however, the allegations
were not an event or occurrence, then removal was proper and remand
was improper.35 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
exception did not apply, and the federal court had CAFA jurisdiction.36
Not surprisingly, the parties disagreed as to the scope of the term, “an
event or occurrence” and offered their preferred meanings of the phrase.37
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the parties’ respective definitions
and arrived at its own meaning of “an event or occurrence.”38 The court
started with the axiom that it must look to the plain language of the text
of the statute and because the statute does not define the term “an event
or occurrence,” the court looked to dictionaries for guidance to interpret
the statute’s “words in accordance with their plain and ordinary
meaning.”39 Dictionaries define “event” and “occurrence” essentially the
Id. at 738 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (“For purposes of this subsection . . . a mass action shall be
deemed to be a class action removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise
meets the provisions of those paragraphs”); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I):
As used in subparagraph (A), the term ‘mass action’ shall not include any civil
action in which—all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence
in the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries
in that State or in States contiguous to that State (emphasis added).
31 Spencer, 953 F.3d at 738.
32 Id. at 739.
33 Id. at 739 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)).
34 Spencer, 953 F.3d at 739.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 744.
37 Id. at 739.
38 Id. at 740.
39 Id.
29
30
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same.40 Moreover, the court concluded that the phrase “is broad enough
to include a solitary happening that occurs in a single moment in time
and (in some cases at least) a continuing set of related circumstances.”41
With that broad definition of the two main words in hand, the court
then discussed the meaning of the word “an” preceding the term “event
or occurrence.”42 The court concluded that, although the use of “an”
implies one series of connected circumstances, “it would be a misreading
of the statute to restrict the local event exception to events or occurrences
that are concentrated in a single point in time.”43 A salient example of
this, explained the court, is the World Series–it is “an event” that
encompasses many different occurrences (games, pitches, strikeouts)
over a long, but set, period of time, with the same teams playing.44 With
those definitions and examples, the court concluded that the text was
clear, so the district court erred by resorting to analysis of the legislative
history.45
After analyzing interpretations of the statute by the Third,46 Fifth,47
and Ninth Circuits,48 the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that “the local
event exception applies to a singular harm-causing moment in time, as
well as a contextually connected series of incidents that culminates in
that harm-causing event or occurrence.”49 From there, the court
explained that the allegations in the complaint did not fall within the
local event exception because there was not a sufficient connection among
the defendants, there was not a culminating event, and there were no
allegations that would reasonably constitute one “event or occurrence.”50
First, the acts that led to the harm-causing event or occurrence were
not “collective” and “related.”51 The products were used in different ways
and caused different harms.52 Second, the complaint did not “allege a
single culminating event that caused their harm.”53 Instead, the
Id.
Id.
42 Id. at 741.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2013).
47 Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2014).
48 Nevada v. Bank of America Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012); Allen v. Boeing Co.,
784 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2015).
49 Spencer, 953 F.3d at 742–43.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
40
41
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complaint alleged “a string of events over time and later-resulting
harm.”54 Finally, the complaint failed to show how the defendants’
“conduct came together to create one event or occurrence.”55 There were
no allegations connecting the defendants’ conduct or pointing to a
culminating event as required for the exception.56 In short, because the
complaint did not fit within the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of “event or
occurrence”—i.e., because it did not allege “a continuous, related course
of conduct culminating in one harm-causing event or occurrence”—the
court held that it did not fall within the local event exception, and remand
was improper.57
III. CLASS ACTIONS
A. Class Action Incentive Awards Are Unlawful and Attorney Fee
Petitions in Class Actions Must Be Filed Before Objections to Such
Fees Are Due
In a move to curb errors that have become “commonplace in everyday
class-action practice,” the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson v. NPAS Sols.,
LLC,58 held (1) that a motion requesting attorney fees must be filed
before objections to such fees are due; and (2) that incentive awards that
compensate a class representative for his time and rewards him for
bringing a lawsuit are unlawful.59 Although the law has been clear on
these issues, courts have been ignoring it.60 The holdings in Johnson put
a stop to that.
In Johnson, the plaintiff, Charles Johnson—on behalf of himself and a
putative class—sued, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227. The case quickly proceeded to
the settlement phase. The parties jointly filed a notice of settlement,
Johnson moved to certify the class, the district court preliminarily
approved the settlement, certified the class for settlement purposes, and
appointed Johnson as the class representative and his lawyers as class
counsel. The district court also ruled that Johnson could “petition the
Court to receive an amount not to exceed $6,000 as acknowledgment of
his role in prosecuting this case on behalf of the class members,” and set
March 19 as the deadline for class members to opt out of the settlement
Id.
Id. at 744.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 975 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020).
59 Id. at 1252–53.
60 Id. at 1259.
54
55
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and to file objections to the settlement.61The district court also set April
6th—eighteen days after the opt out/objection deadline—as the date by
which class counsel had to submit a petition for attorneys’ fees and
costs.62
No class member opted out, but one objected to the settlement and
challenged, among other things, (1) the district court’s decision to set the
objection deadline before the deadline for class counsel to file their
attorneys’ fee petition, which she contended violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 2363
and the Due Process Clause; and (2) that Johnson’s $6,000 incentive
award contravened Supreme Court precedent and created a conflict of
interest between Johnson and other class members.64 The district court
overruled the objection and approved the settlement.65
On appeal, as to the first issue, the Eleventh Circuit relied simply on
the plain language of Rule 23(h) to reach a fairly obvious decision.66 Rule
23(h) provides, in part, as follows:
In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s
fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’
agreement. The following procedures apply:
(1) A claim for an award must be made by motion under Rule 54(d)(2),
subject to the provisions of this subdivision (h), at a time the court sets.
Notice of the motion must be served on all parties and, for motions by
class counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable manner.
(2) A class member, or a party from whom payment is sought, may
object to the motion.67

Although Johnson argued that class members were adequately
informed of the fees sought via the class notice—which preceded the
objection deadline and stated that class counsel sought a 30% fee—the
court could not ignore the plain language of the statute, which required
class members have the opportunity to object to the fee motion itself, not
the notice that such a motion would be filed.68 Aside from the
requirements of the text of the statute, the court also noted that this rule

Id. at 1249.
Id.
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
64 Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1250.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1251.
67 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
68 Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1252.
61
62
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made good “practical sense.”69 First, it allows class members to have full
information when deciding whether to object to a fee request.70 For
example, the class notice would not contain the same information
regarding “the details of class counsel’s hours and expenses and the
rationale for the fee request,” whereas the petition for fees would.71
Second, this timing requirement allows the district court to ensure
that the adversarial process is fully tested.72 Notwithstanding class
counsel’s fiduciary duty to the class, there is an inherent conflict in class
counsel’s desire to get paid as much as possible out of a settlement and
obtaining the largest possible recovery for class members.73
Understandably then, the district court must “assume the role of
fiduciary for the class plaintiffs and ensure that the class is afforded the
opportunity to represent its own best interests.”74 Of course, this cannot
happen if the court requires objections to the fee award to be filed before
class counsel has filed its fee petition. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court holding that “by requiring class members to
object to an award of attorneys’ fees before class counsel had filed their
fee petition, the district court violated Rule 23(h).”75
Following the Eighth Circuit, the court then went on to determine
whether the error was harmless, “by asking whether the complaining
party’s substantial rights have been affected,” a doctrine the Eleventh
Circuit had not yet applied to a Rule 23(h) violation.76 If the district
court’s misapplication of the Rule “doesn’t deny a party the opportunity
to present arguments that would have changed the outcome, the error is
harmless.”77 The appellant filed a detailed objection to the attorney fee
award and, at the fairness hearing—after having had ample opportunity
to review the fee petition that was filed after her objection—raised
essentially the same arguments.78 Because the arguments raised both
before and after the filing of the fee petition were the same, the court
Id.
Id.
71 Id. (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d
622, 638 (7th Cir. 2014)).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1252–53.
74 Id. at 1253 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Mercury Interactive
Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2010)).
75 Id. The court also noted that the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had explicitly
reached the same holding and that the Third Circuit had implied as much in dicta. Id. at
1253 n.5.
76 Id. at 1253.
77 Id. at 1254.
78 Id.
69
70
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failed to see how the appellant was “‘deprived of the opportunity to
present’ additional objections” and held that the error was harmless.79
As to the next issue, regarding the district court’s approval of a $6,000
“incentive payment” to Johnson as the class representative, the Eleventh
Circuit relied on two cases from the 1880s, Trustees v. Greenough,80 and
Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus,81 in holding that such an
award is unlawful.82 Greenough and Pettus are the “seminal cases
establishing the rule . . . that attorneys’ fees can be paid from a ‘common
fund’ . . . [and they] establish limits on the types of awards that attorneys
and litigants may recover from the fund.”83 The court found that in recent
years, however, this established rule has been “largely overlooked.”84
In Greenough, the most important case, the class representative
engaged in litigation with “great vigor and at much expense,” and as a
result, secured and saved a large amount of a trust fund on behalf of the
class.85 The class representative “bore the whole burden of this litigation
himself, and he advanced most of the expenses which were necessary for
the purpose of rendering it effective and successful.”86 He then sought “an
allowance out of the fund to cover his expenses and services.”87 He was
therefore allowed an award of “necessary expenditures, including what
amounted to attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses” such as railroad
fares and hotel bills and “an allowance of $2,500 a year for ten years of
personal services.”88
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court could
properly reimburse the class representative for “his reasonable costs,
counsel fees, charges, and expenses incurred in the fair prosecution of the
suit, and in reclaiming and rescuing the trust fund.”89 The reasoning
made sense—the class representative had sued on behalf of the class, the
members of which benefited from the proceedings, and he spent “a large
amount of money.”90 He was therefore entitled to be compensated out of
the fund; otherwise, the other class members would have been unjustly
79 Id. at 1254–55 (quoting Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1213
(1995)).
80 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
81 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
82 Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1255.
83 Id. at 1255–56.
84 Id.
85 Id. (quoting Greenough, 105 U.S. at 529).
86 Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
87 Id. 1256 (quoting Greenough, 105 U.S. at 529).
88 Id. at 1256.
89 Id. (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Greenough, 105 U.S. at 537).
90 Id. at 1257 (quoting Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532).
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enriched.91 His allowance for “personal services and private expenses,”
however, was “decidedly objectionable,” because such an allowance
“would present too great a temptation to parties to intermeddle in the
management of valuable property or funds in which they have only the
interest of creditors.”92
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[a] plaintiff suing on behalf of a
class can be reimbursed for attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in
carrying on the litigation, but he cannot be paid a salary or be reimbursed
for his personal expenses.”93 As a result, “the modern-day incentive
award for a class representative is roughly analogous to a salary—in
Greenough’s terms, payment for ‘personal services’”—and is improper.94
In fact, the court noted that such an award presents “even more
pronounced risks today than the salary and expense reimbursements
disapproved in Greenough[] [because they] are intended not only to
compensate class representatives for their time (i.e., as a salary), but also
to promote litigation by providing a prize to be won (i.e., as a bounty).”95
The court acknowledged that such awards have become routine and
explained that such routineness cannot negate Supreme Court
precedent.96 The court held it was time to get back on track.97 “‘To the
extent that incentive awards are common, they are like dandelions on an
unmowed lawn—present more by inattention than by design.’”98 The
court “remand[ed] the case so that the district court can adequately
explain its fee award to class counsel, its denial of Dickenson’s objections,
and its approval of the settlement.”99

Id.
Id. (quoting Greenough, 105 U.S. at 537–38). Three years later, the Supreme Court
decided Pettus, which “broke new ground” as the first Supreme Court case to recognize that
attorneys “had a claim to fees payable out of a common fund which has been created through
their efforts” and that “a fee could be awarded based upon a percentage of the fund
recovered for the class.” Id. (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Camden I Condo. Ass’n,
Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 1991)).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1258.
96 Id. at 1259.
97 Id. at 1260.
98 Id. at 1259–60 (quoting In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 722 (6th Cir.
2013)).
99 Id. at 1264.
91
92
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IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The Plaintiff’s Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(2)100 is a “Final Decision” That Provides Appellate
Jurisdiction
In Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc.,101 the court was required to sort through
precedent the Chief Judge called an “egregious mess”102 to determine
whether a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal constitutes a “final decision”
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291103 for appellate jurisdiction.104 The court held that
the district court’s grant of the plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal
to create a “final judgment with respect to all claims asserted in this
action” was a final decision, under § 1291, that provided the Eleventh
Circuit jurisdiction.105
The procedural history in Corley was unusual and complicated. The
Corleys filed the asbestos lawsuit in Alabama state court against dozens
of companies that allegedly supplied products containing asbestos that
caused Mr. Corley’s mesothelioma. The defendants removed to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, and
then the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) transferred it
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania district court
granted summary judgment in favor of many of the defendants based on
the statute of limitations. After the case had been whittled down to two
remaining defendants, the MDL remanded the suit back to the Northern
District of Alabama which dismissed the remaining two defendants with
prejudice.106
The plaintiffs appealed the rulings of the Pennsylvania district court
to the Eleventh Circuit,107 but two defendants then filed suggestions of
bankruptcy in that appeal revealing that the plaintiffs’ claims against

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
965 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2020).
102 Id. at 1236 (Pryor, C.J., concurring) (quoting Williams v. Siedenbach, 958 F.3d 341,
355 (5th Cir. 2020)).
103 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
104 Corley, 965 F.3d at 1225.
105 Id. at 1227.
106 Id. at 1225–26.
107 Id. at 1225. The Eleventh Circuit’s “territorial jurisdiction” to hear an appeal of a
district court order outside the Eleventh Circuit was also a subject of the opinion. The
Eleventh Circuit found that it did indeed have territorial jurisdiction to hear an appeal of
an order from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1294, which itself
was the subject of an intracircuit split of authority. Id. at 1231–33.
100
101
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them had not been adjudicated below and remained pending.108 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit remanded to the district court where the plaintiffs
moved to voluntarily dismiss the claims, without prejudice under Rule
41(a)(2), against those bankrupt defendants.109 The district court granted
the motion to dismiss the two defendants in what it called a “final
judgment with respect to all claims asserted in this action.”110 The
plaintiffs appealed again seeking review of the Pennsylvania court’s
grant of summary judgment.111
The Eleventh Circuit held that it did have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 for “final decisions.”112 The Court recognized that the case law in
the Eleventh Circuit on this issue where voluntary dismissals are
involved is splintered and “the canvas looks like one that Jackson Pollock
got to first.”113 The court held that the divergent decisions are traced to
two decisions of the former Fifth Circuit: LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc.,114
which held, under its facts, that the voluntary dismissal was a final
judgment for appeal, and Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,115 which
held, under its facts, that a voluntary dismissal of a remaining
substantive paragraph of the plaintiff’s complaint was not a final
judgment for appeal.116
In 1995, the conflict on this issue in the Eleventh Circuit arose in Mesa
v. United States117 involving an order granting a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice.118 The Eleventh Circuit held in Mesa that under Ryan,
a voluntary dismissal without prejudice cannot be considered final
because “without prejudice” means the plaintiff can re-file those claims,
and this became the understanding of finality in this Circuit
thereafter.119 After analyzing various other Circuit opinions involving
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1226–27.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1231. As mentioned above, the court also analyzed the “territorial jurisdiction”
issue created by the review of an out-of-circuit district court. The court also analyzed and
determined, sua sponte, whether the plaintiffs had standing to appeal an order they
requested—dismissal of the two bankrupt defendants. The court found that although the
plaintiffs were “not adverse” to the dismissal they requested, they were adverse to the
orders on summary judgment which the court found were “just as much a part of the final
judgment as the voluntary-dismissal order.” Id. at 1233–34.
113 Id. at 1228 (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013)).
114 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976).
115 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978).
116 Corley, 965 F.3d at 1228–29.
117 61 F.3d 20, 21 (11th Cir. 1995).
118 Corley, 965 F.3d at 1229–30.
119 Id.
108
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voluntary dismissals and appellate jurisdiction, the court held that the
Eleventh Circuit decisions cannot be harmonized so the
“earliest-precedent rule” applies.120 Finding that the 1992 opinion in
McGregor v. Board of Commissioners121 both pre-dates Mesa and is
consistent with prior precedent, it controls.122 Thus, the court held that
“an order granting a motion to voluntarily dismiss the remainder of a
complaint under Rule 41(a)(2) ‘qualifies as a final judgment for purposes
of appeal.’”123
B. District Courts Have the Power to Grant or Deny Sanctions Even
When it Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Underlying
Case
In Hyde v. Irish,124 the court determined that even when a district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying case or
controversy, the court still has the power to decide “collateral” matters
including things like the imposition of costs, attorneys’ fees, and
contempt sanctions “to ensure the maintenance of orderly procedure.”125
Hyde involved a failed real estate project in the Florida Keys where
investors in the failed venture sued the developer, alleging fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty, among other things including an allegation that the
developer had used investor funds for things other than the joint
venture.126

Id. at 1231.
956 F.2d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 1992).
122 Corley, 965 F.3d at 1231.
123 Id. (quoting McGregor, 956 F.3d at 1020). Judge William Pryor, who authored the
opinion, also submitted a concurring opinion criticizing the use of Rule 41 dismissals to
create appellate jurisdiction. Judge Pryor noted that most other Circuits have similar
intracircuit splits of authority on this issue and suggested that litigants or district courts
use alternatives to Rule 41 dismissals to create appellate jurisdiction. For example, he
suggested that district courts employ Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) to designate decisions on the
merits as final that decide or resolve fewer than all claims or parties. He also suggested
that district courts may sever a party’s remaining claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, among
other possibilities including allowing the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to drop
lingering claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) or the district court itself could drop parties
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. While Judge Pryor claimed to express no opinion on the need for
avoiding Rule 41 and employing the alternative methods, he clearly expressed frustration
about the less-than-clear precedent and what he apparently considers to be unnecessary
litigation to achieve the jurisdictional appellate goals of many litigants. See Corley, 965
F.3d at 1235–38 (Pryor, C.J., concurring).
124 962 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2020).
125 Id. at 1309–10.
126 Id. at 1308.
120
121
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The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant
developer who sought sanctions against the plaintiffs for what he
contended were knowingly false allegations in the complaint about the
misuse of investor funds.127 On appeal of the summary judgment ruling,
the Eleventh Circuit questioned subject matter jurisdiction which had
been based on diversity of citizenship.128 On remand to address the
subject matter jurisdiction question, the district court found that the
court did in fact lack subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the
case.129 While subject matter jurisdiction was being investigated, the
defendant filed a motion for sanctions, claiming that the plaintiffs knew
or should have known the allegations about the misuse of funds were
false.130 The district court denied the motion for sanctions.131
On appeal, before deciding whether the denial of the motion for
sanctions was proper, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether the
district court had jurisdiction over the sanctions dispute when it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction for the underlying case.132 Relying on
Supreme Court precedent governing sanctions under Rule 11,133 the
court held that sanctions and attorney or party misconduct issues,
including the court’s powers under § 1927, are “collateral” matters.134
The court discussed the distinction between the underlying case or
controversy and certain “collateral” matters to analyze the jurisdictional
requirements.135 While the underlying case or controversy includes the
merits of the dispute and procedural questions, there is a limited set of
issues that are “collateral to the merits” of the case, including “the
imposition of costs, attorney’s fees, and contempt sanctions.”136
Finding “collateral” matters to be important to ensuring the
maintenance of orderly procedure, many such collateral matters involve
the power to enforce compliance with the rules and standards that keep
the judiciary running smoothly.137 The court concluded that even if the
court lacks jurisdiction to hear the merits of a case—something required
Id. at 1308–09.
Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
129 Hyde, 962 F.3d at 1308.
130 Id. at 1308–09.
131 Id. at 1309. The basis for the sanctions motion was the district court’s inherent
powers or 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 was not at issue on the issue of sanctions.
132 Id.
133 See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137–39 (1992).
134 Hyde, 962 F.3d at 1310.
135 Id. at 1309.
136 Id. at 1309 (citing Willy, at 137–39; and then Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 395 (1990)).
137 Id. at 1309–10 (citing Willy, 503 U.S. at 137).
127
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by the constitution for a case or controversy—a ruling on collateral
matters does not signify a court’s assessment of the legal merits of the
case, such as in a Rule 11 challenge.138 Instead, a ruling on collateral
matters concerns a collateral issue: “whether the attorney has abused the
judicial process” which does not improperly consider the “‘case or
controversy’ over which it lacks jurisdiction.”139 Also, exercising
jurisdiction over a collateral matter such as sanctions promotes having
rules of procedure obeyed—an interest that outlives the merits of a
case.140 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that otherwise, “parties who
abuse the judicial procedures could get off scot-free anytime it turned out
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”141 The court
announced that it joins several other Circuits in holding that district
courts in the Eleventh Circuit “may address a sanctions motion based on
its inherent powers or § 1927 even if it lacks jurisdiction over the
underlying case.”142
C. Forum Non Conveniens Does Not Have a “Foreign Investment”
Standard and Does Not Turn on Whether Foreign Plaintiffs
Outnumber Domestic Plaintiffs
In Otto Candies, LLC v. Citigroup, Inc.,143 the Eleventh Circuit
engaged in a thorough analysis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
and held that neither (1) the choice of two American plaintiffs to invest
in a foreign entity, nor (2) the fact that thirty-seven foreign plaintiffs
outnumbered the two American plaintiffs eroded the deference owed to
their choice of forum.144
The complex Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) case involved two American plaintiffs, thirty-seven foreign
plaintiffs, one American defendant, and an allegedly fraudulent scheme
that took place in America and in Mexico, with the American defendant

Id. at 1309.
Id. (quoting Willy, 503 U.S. at 138).
140 Id. at 1310 (internal punctuation omitted).
141 Id.
142 Id. See also Ratliff v. Stewart, 508 F.3d 225, 231 n. 7 (5th Cir. 2007); Red Carpet
Studios Div. of Source Advant., Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Jaritz
Indus., 151 F.3d 93, 96–97 (3d Cir. 1998); Fidrych v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124, 137–
38 (4th Cir. 2020); Zerger & Mauer LLP v. City of Greenwood, 751 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir.
2014). The opinion was authored by Judge Amul R. Thapar, United States Circuit Judge
for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. The Sixth Circuit is one of the other Circuits
in agreement with the rule announced in Hyde.
143 963 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2020).
144 Id. at 1335.
138
139
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allegedly engaging in fraudulent activity in the United States.145 Faced
with these allegations, the district court granted the defendant’s motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens.146 The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that “the district court mistakenly gave only ‘reduced’ deference
to the American plaintiffs’ choice of forum” and that “the American
defendant—which had the burden of persuasion—did not support its
claims that most of the relevant documents and witnesses [were] located
in Mexico.”147
The underlying factual allegations were complex, but distilled to their
essence, were that a lender (Citigroup) provided fraudulent cash
advances to a Mexican company that lured the plaintiffs “into investing
in or contracting with” the company and that Citigroup knowingly
misrepresented the company’s financial stability.148 Although the
scandal began unfolding in Mexico, it “reverberated in the United
States.”149 Specifically, “[t]he plaintiffs allege that some of the
misrepresentations were made during meetings in the United States, on
telephone calls to and from the United States, in emails located on
servers in the United States, and in written materials reviewed, revised,
or approved by Citigroup personnel in the United States.”150 Even so, the
district court granted Citigroup’s motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens.151
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine, which provides that
a district court has the power to decline to hear a case even when
jurisdiction and venue are proper.152 It is flexible and designed to prevent
litigation that would be oppressive and vexatious to a defendant.153
“Because the plaintiff’s forum choice ‘should rarely be disturbed,’ a forum
non conveniens dismissal is subject to three conditions.”154 Pertinent to
this article, one of the factors is that “the balance of the relative private
and public interests must weigh in favor of dismissal to justify invocation
of the doctrine.”155
Id.
Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1337.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1338. See Otto Candies, LLC v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 16-cv-20725-GAYLES, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14646, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2018).
152 Otto Candies, 963 F.3d at 1338.
153 Id. at 1338.
154 Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1947)).
155 Id.
145
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In a lengthy opinion, the court examined all factors, but two stood out.
First, with respect to the private interest factor, the court held that
“investment in a foreign entity or country alone is not enough to dilute
the threshold presumption that an American citizen has chosen the most
convenient forum.”156 Overcoming that threshold is a heavy burden for
the defendant.157 The defendant must offer “‘positive evidence of
unusually extreme circumstances,’ and the district court must be
‘thoroughly convinced that material injustice is manifest before
exercising any such discretion as may exist to deny a United States
citizen access to the courts of this country.”158
Citigroup failed to offer such positive evidence, and the Eleventh
Circuit was not convinced that Citigroup would suffer material injustice
by having to litigate in its home country.159 Important to the analysis was
the fact that, although the claims arose from business dealings in Mexico,
the plaintiffs did not complain that the conduct or injuries occurred
primarily in Mexico.160 Even though Citigroup insisted that “the fraud
against the plaintiffs was really perpetrated by Mexican entities in
Mexico,” the dispute focused on Citigroup’s conduct in the United States,
as several of the allegedly fraudulent communications occurred in the
United States.161 Moreover, Citigroup, a United States resident, was the
only defendant.162 For those reasons, the Eleventh Circuit did not find
persuasive Citigroup’s argument that a trial here would be inconvenient
to it.163
Disposing of that issue, the court then turned to Citigroup’s argument
that “where foreign plaintiffs significantly outnumber domestic
plaintiffs, diminished deference should be applied to all of the plaintiffs’
forum choice.”164 The court noted that “the Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument that Piper Aircraft stands for the proposition that ‘when both
domestic and foreign plaintiffs are present, the strong presumption in

Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1339.
158 Id. (quoting SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, 382 F.3d 1097,
1101 (11th Cir., 2004)).
159 Id. at 1341–43.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. (“When an American plaintiff sues an American defendant for conduct allegedly
occurring in the United States, it should not be easy for the defendant to obtain a forum
non conveniens dismissal.”).
164 Id.
156
157
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favor of the domestic plaintiff's choice of forum is somehow lessened.’”165
In addition to agreeing with the Ninth Circuit on that point, the court
found no “practical or doctrinal basis to reduce deference to domestic
plaintiffs who sue alongside foreign plaintiffs, particularly when they all
sue a single American defendant for conduct that they allege occurred in
the United States.”166 This is because “the presence of foreign plaintiffs
does not change the otherwise domestic nature of a complaint—here, that
Citigroup committed wrongs in or from the United States, where it is
based.”167
Finally, addressing the potential inconvenience of Citigroup having to
travel to Mexico for dozens of depositions, the court noted that “[t]he
district court has broad discretion over the location of depositions and the
general rule is that plaintiffs are required to make themselves available
for examination in the district in which they bring suit,”168 while, in
contrast, the foreign plaintiffs would not be able to “drag Citigroup to all
corners of the globe to take corporate depositions, as there is a
presumption that a defendant will be deposed in the district of its
residence or principal place of business.”169 Thus, “the ratio of domestic
to foreign plaintiffs does not necessarily have a bearing on Citigroup’s
convenience.”170
In sum, it was inappropriate for the district court to discount or reduce
the deference owed to the chosen forum of the American plaintiffs based
on their decision to invest or transact business abroad. Nor was there any
other reason to deviate from the normal rule that an American plaintiff
suing in the United States is presumed to have chosen the most
convenient forum. A remand is therefore warranted.171
The court cautioned, however, that its holding was narrow and that
“[t]he plaintiff-friendly, facial reading of the complaint leads only to an
initial presumption.”172 In fact, “[t]hat presumption is not dispositive,
and a defendant can always marshal positive evidence to overcome it.”173

165 Id. at 1344 (quoting Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1228 (9th
Cir. 2011)).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. (internal citations omitted).
169 Id. at 1344–45. As an aside, with the proliferation of remote video depositions, such
an issue is likely become less significant over time. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(4).
170 Otto Candies, 963 F.3d at 1345.
171 Id. at 1345–46.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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V. SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS
A. Federal Courts Should Look to State Law to Decide Whether a
Shareholder’s Claim Brought Under a Federal Statute is Direct or
Derivative
In Freedman v. magicJack Vocaltec Ltd.,174 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed an issue of first impression—whether federal courts should
look to state law to decide whether a shareholder’s claim brought under
a federal statute is direct or derivative.175 Ultimately, the court held “that
federal courts should look to state law to decide the issue.”176
The plaintiff, a shareholder of magicJack Vocaltec Ltd. (magicJack)
filed a putative class action against magicJack and individuals who were
current or former magicJack directors. He alleged that magicJack issued
two proxy statements that contained material misrepresentations about
(1) the valuation and financial prospects of a company (Broadsmart) that
magicJack had previously acquired; and (2) a compensation package for
magicJack executives. After the two proxy statements were issued,
magicJack entered into a sale agreement providing that magicJack
would be sold for $8.71 per share. Freedman claimed, on behalf of himself
and the putative class, to have suffered injuries based on misleading
information contained in the proxies (i.e., they were denied the ability to
exercise an informed vote). He also claimed that he and the other
shareholders were injured due to the share price, which was allegedly
less than an earlier non-binding, pre-due diligence offer.177
The complaint contained a count for alleged violation of Section 14(a)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934178 (the Act) and SEC Rule
14a–9. magicJack moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were
derivative in nature and Plaintiff had not made the required demand on
the corporation before asserting the derivative claim. 179
Although an issue of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, the
court noted that the Second,180 Sixth,181 Seventh,182 Eighth,183 and

963 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1130.
176 Id. at 1134.
177 Id. at 1128–29
178 Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1934).
179 Freedman, 963 F.3d at 1130.
180 AHW Inv. P’ship v. Citigroup, Inc., 806 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2015).
181 Casden v. Burns, 306 F. App’x 966, 974 (6th Cir. 2009).
182 In re Abbott Labs. Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 2003);
Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706, 715 (7th Cir. 1997).
183 Kokocinski ex rel. Medtronic, Inc. v. Collins, 850 F.3d 354, 359 n.4 (8th Cir. 2017).
174
175
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Ninth184 Circuits have all held that, “although federal law provides the
rule of decision, federal courts should look to state law in deciding the
issue of whether a particular suit is direct or derivative.”185 This is
because, “when a federal court fills gaps in a federal statute with state
law, the ‘state law is incorporated into federal common law.’ So, we look
to the law of the state (or place) of incorporation to determine whether
an action is direct or derivative.”186 There were two reasons for this.
“First, ‘corporate law is overwhelmingly the province of the states.’”187
This provides “certainty and predictability of result while generally
protecting the justified expectations of parties with interests in the
corporation.”188 Second, when “private parties have entered into legal
relationships with the expectation that their rights and obligations would
be governed by state-law standards”—such as corporations, which are
creatures of state law—“there is a presumption that state law should be
incorporated into federal common law.”189 For those reasons, the
Eleventh Circuit held for the first time that “federal courts should look
to state law to decide the issue of whether a claim brought under a federal
statute is direct or derivative.”190
VI. CONCLUSION
The 2020 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, many of
which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit. While
the survey is not intended to be exhaustive of all noteworthy cases
decided by the Eleventh Circuit in 2020, the authors have attempted to
provide material that will be useful to practitioners with relevant
updates in the area of federal trial practice and procedure in the Eleventh
Circuit.

Lapidus v. Hecht, 232 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 2000).
Freedman, 963 F.3d at 1132.
186 Id. (internal citations and punctuation omitted) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper, 500 U.S.
90, 98 (1991)).
187 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165,
176 (2d Cir. 2007)).
188 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para
El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b).
189 Id. at 1132–33 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98).
190 Id. at 1134. Applying the rule to the case, the court held that it was a direct action,
regardless of the label plaintiff put on it, because he “failed to allege that he suffered
damages independent of the damages that magicJack (and all of its shareholders)
suffered”—the key issue in determining whether a claim is derivative. Id. at 1137.
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